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In April 1998, within the initiation of Section 912c studies (PM Oversight of Life 
Cycle Support), DoD expanded the responsibilities of Program Managers for designing 
and producing new weapon systems to include more accountability for the TOC of the 
systems, including O&S (Operation and Support) costs. At a December 1998 DSAC 
(Defense Systems Affordability Council), each service agreed to provide 10 program 
names for the 912c study. DoD would continue to track all 30 service pilot programs as 
R-TOC programs. This thesis analyzes the utilization of Reduction of Total Ownership 
Costs (R-TOC) pilot programs in DoD Services.  It identifies the lessons learned from the 
R-TOC pilot programs and the obstacles encountered to promote efficient reductions in 
the Total Ownership Costs of DoD weapon systems. It also makes recommendations for 
DoD leadership to establish a more efficient R-TOC environment.  
The conclusion is that the performance of R-TOC is efficient because it forces 
PMs to consider TOC in their programs, and helps to identify obstacles, and encourages 
saving initiatives. Although further progress will be captured by blocking the inhibitors 
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Increased wear and tear on DoD weapon systems, due to the unprecedented high 
pace of deployments in recent years, has hurt readiness and raised maintenance costs. The 
services, so far, have covered the increased costs by shifting funds from their 
modernization accounts and delaying new procurement, thereby further increasing the 
burden on existing equipment. Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, former Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), USD (AT&L), described this process as 
a “vicious cycle.” 
DoD attacked the “vicious cycle” problem by implementing Reduction of Total 
Ownership (R-TOC) Pilot Programs to identify all TOC cost drivers and the necessary 
initiatives to reduce these drivers. In April 1998, within the initiation of Section 912c 
studies (PM Oversight of Life Cycle Support), DoD expanded the responsibilities of 
Program Managers for designing and producing new weapon systems to include more 
accountability for the TOC of the systems, including O&S (Operation and Support) costs. 
At a December 1998 DSAC (Defense Systems Affordability Council), each service 
agreed to provide 10 program names for the 912c study. DoD would continue to track all 
30 service pilot programs as R-TOC programs [Ref. 1]. 
DoD initially planned to set and achieve Total Ownership Cost Reduction targets 
for R-TOC pilot programs and then to extend these targets to all programs and become 
increasingly more aggressive as lessons learned were applied across all systems. 
The primary focus of the pilot programs is that industry, by assuming 
responsibility for O&S costs, would have incentives to modernize the equipment, and 
thereby make it more reliable and cheaper to maintain by having a stake in the savings. 
The R-TOC Pilot Programs were established as the key players in implementing 
R-TOC throughout all DoD systems by: 
• developing R-TOC strategies and sharing “lessons learned” 
• identifying needed policy and legislative changes 
• gaining visibility for the Operation & Support costs 
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In his “Into the 21st Century –A Strategy for Affordability” memorandum, 
January, 20, 1999, Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, Undersecretary of Defense, assigned two top-
level objectives for the R-TOC Pilot Programs. 
• New systems must incur at least 50% less TOC than the systems they 
replace 
• For fielded systems, the O&S costs per weapon system per year compared 
to FY1997 baselines must be reduced as follows: 7% by FY2000, 10% by 
FY2001, and 20% by FY2005 
B. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis will analyze the overall efficiency of R-TOC pilot programs in DoD, 
whether or not R-TOC has thus far been a value-adding activity, and the performance of 
R-TOC pilot programs and whether they are falling short of or exceeding their goals. 
This thesis will also ascertain the needed areas in R-TOC efforts that should be 
considered higher priority, and what DoD leadership must do to promote R-TOC 
initiatives. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
Are DoD R-TOC pilot programs achieving their objectives?   
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
• Why is R-TOC important for DoD? 
• What are the R-TOC pilot programs? 
• How are the R-TOC pilot programs currently performing? 
• What is needed from DoD leadership to enhance R-TOC efforts in DoD 
services? 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis analyzes the utilization of R-TOC pilot programs in DoD Services.  It 
identifies the lessons learned from the R-TOC pilot programs and the obstacles 
encountered to promote efficient reductions in the Total Ownership Costs of DoD 
weapon systems. It also makes recommendations for DoD leadership to establish a more 
efficient R-TOC environment. 
This thesis does not contain any individual discussions of each of the 30 R-TOC 
pilot programs. The metrics for efficiency of R-TOC pilot programs are derived from 
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GAO reports, program briefings, congressional hearings, budget reviews and the results 
from interviews with the government and contractor personnel affiliated with the R-TOC 
pilot programs.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis consists of the following: 
• Conduct a literature review of books, professional journals, magazine 
articles, web-based materials, pilot programs’ websites, GAO reports, and 
other library information sources 
• Survey active R-TOC Pilot Programs via the internet and phone interviews 
with key contractor and government personnel involved in R-TOC 
programs 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I introduces the topic and 
provides background information on the R-TOC concept. 
Chapter II presents the development of the R-TOC pilot programs and the need 
for establishing them. It also defines the types of initiatives identified by the pilot 
programs. 
Chapter III outlines the general research strategy, and presents the researcher’s 
findings on R-TOC.  
Chapter IV analyzes the data highlighting the problems and successful 
approaches. 
Chapter V summarizes the thesis conclusions and makes recommendations to 
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II.  R-TOC PILOT PROGRAMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss the importance of the R-TOC pilot program and will 
provide an introduction to the R-TOC pilot programs. 
B. WHY IS R-TOC IMPORTANT FOR DOD? 
The R-TOC pilot program was established in response to long-standing concerns 
about the adverse impact of defense budgetary and operational trends on force structure 
and readiness. Declining procurement funds have caused a rapidly aging inventory. 
Rising O&S costs consume larger amounts of the defense budget, and therefore, even less 
is available for modernization [Ref. 2]. 
On July 16, 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, testifying before the 
House Appropriations Committee on the DoD budget, stated, “The U.S. Armed Services 
have been under-funded over a sustained period of years.” He concluded by stating that 
“The shortfalls are considerably worse than I had previously imagined” [Ref. 3]. 
Historical DoD budget data can be used to observe trends in the size and the 
composition of DoD’s budget. Table 1 illustrates the DoD Budget Authority (051) 1 
between 1987-2002. The first column indicates that the DoD budget has increased by a 
factor of 1.2 since 1987. This figure is a misleading indicator of growth in the DoD 
budget for the following reasons: 
• The inflation factor. The value of the dollar has decreased during this era. 
Column 2 is the value of each year’s budget in terms of 2002 constant 
dollars. The real value of DoD’s budget between 1987-2002 has gradually 
shrunk by 24 percent. 
• Comparison of DoD’s budget with the federal budget and the GDP helps 
in assessing of trends in the size of DoD’s budget. If the government 
budget and the GDP are following different trends, the contraction of 
DoD’s budget may be relatively more drastic. Table 1 illustrates that the 
share of DoD’s budget from both GDP and federal outlays has been 
gradually decreasing since 1987. 
 
                                                 
1 DoD Budget Authority (051) includes funding for Desert/Storm and allied Gulf War contribution. 
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% of DoD 
Budget in 
Federal Outlays 
1987 274 434.92 4647 5.89 1004.1 27.29 
1988    283.2 431.71 5014.7 5.65 1064.5 26.60 
1989    290.8 422.67 5405.5 5.38 1143.7 25.43 
1990 293 404.13 5735.6 5.11 1253.2 23.38 
1991    287.5 380.72 5930.4 4.85 1324.4 21.70 
1992 282 362.46 6218.6 4.53 1381.7 20.41 
1993    267.2 333.58 6558.4 4.07 1409.4 18.96 
1994    251.4 305.83 6944.6 3.62 1461.7 17.20 
1995   255.7 302.29 7324 3.49 1515.7 16.87 
1996   254.4 292.41 7694.6 3.31 1560.5 16.30 
1997 258 289.88 8185.2 3.15 1601.2 16.11 
1998   258.6 286.06 8663.9 2.98 1652.6 15.65 
1999   278.6 301.51 9124.3 3.05 1701.9 16.37 
2000   290.5 304.18 9744.3 2.98 1788.8 16.24 
2001   309.9 315.58 10150.5 3.05 1863.9 16.63 
2002  329.9 329.9 10361.6 3.18 2052.3 16.07 
 
Table 1. DoD Budget for 1987-2002 (in Billions of Dollars)2. 
 
Table 2 shows a break down of DoD’s budget by component and is converted into 
2002 constant dollars. The main components of DoD’s budget are Military Personnel, 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M), Procurement, and Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation (RDT&E). 
The following information from Table 2 is noteworthy for our research: 
• Military Personal Expenditures consume a large part of DoD’s budget. 
Table 2 illustrates that both Military Personnel funding and Budget 
Authority have decreased.  Figure 1 shows Military Personnel funding as a 






                                                 




Personnel O&M Procurement R&D Other Total Budget Authority (051) 
1987 114.29 120.95 128.1 53.33 15.85 434.92 
1988 116.01 123.02 123.48 55.95 13.25 431.71 
1989 113.96 124.41 116.28 55.52 12.5 422.67 
1990 108.83 121.93 112.28 50.34 10.75 404.13 
1991 104.5 114.17 104.77 47.02 10.26 380.72 
1992 104.37 120.57 80.98 47.04 9.5 362.46 
1993 94.88 111.36 65.92 45.57 15.85 333.58 
1994 86.86 107.89 53.65 42.09 15.34 305.83 
1995 84.73 111.01 51.6 40.83 14.12 302.29 
1996 80.23 107.7 48.74 40.23 15.51 292.41 
1997 78.99 103.82 48.31 40.9 17.86 289.88 
1998 77.21 107.52 49.56 41.04 10.73 286.06 
1999 76.4 113.64 55.3 41.45 14.72 301.51 
2000 77.27 113.93 57.6 40.52 14.86 304.18 
2001 78.31 117.92 63.75 42.36 13.24 315.58 
2002 82 127.7 61.1 48.4 10.71 329.91 
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Figure 1. Military Personnel Funding as a Percentage of DoD’s Budget. 
 
The increasing trend until 1993 indicates transfers from the modernization 
account (Procurement) to Military Personnel funding. The percentage level of 1987 and 
below was not reached again until 1999. However, this decline can be attributed to the 
downsizing of the DoD personnel. During 1987-1998 Total DoD active-duty personnel 
decreased from 2,200,000 to 1,400,000, a 36 % drop in the number of personnel [Ref. 4]. 
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O&M expenditures consume the largest portion of the DoD budget. The O&M 
account funds a wide range of activities, from the fuel used in the fighter planes to health 
care for DoD personnel and their dependents. From 1990 to 1997, in real dollar terms, 
there was a slight decrease in the amount of O&M funding. From 1998 to 2002, O&M 
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Figure 2. O&M Funding as a Percentage of DoD’s Budget. 
 
Figure 2 indicates that the percentage of O&M funding is gradually increasing. 
The foremost reason for this increase is aging equipment. DoD weapons get older and 
cost more as a result of decreased spare part availability and increased maintenance costs. 
In Table 2, the downward trend in the real value of O&M partially reflects 
reduced procurement in the 1990s. After the collapse of the Soviet Communist Regime, 
the threat, which provided the principal reason to sustain the large budgets of the 1980s, 
no longer existed.  
Figure 3 indicates that, in terms of percentages, transfers have been made from 
procurement to overhead accounts (Military Personnel and O&M accounts). The 
percentage of procurement funding in 1987 was 29.5% of DoD’s budget. However, 
8 
between 1993-2002, procurement funding was below 20%. The real dollar value of 
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Figure 3. Procurement Funding as a Percentage of DoD’s Budget. 
 
R&D also experienced a downward trend in real dollar values. However, unlike 
procurement, R&D increased as a percentage of DoD’s budget, when compared to its 
12% level in 1987 (Figure 4). It can be stated that the decreasing procurement share in 
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Figure 4. R&D Funding as a Percentage of DoD’s Budget. 
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The overall picture shown in the aforementioned tables and figures indicates a 
“Death Cycle” within DoD. Shifting funds from procurement to cover the increasing 
maintenance costs of aging weapon systems is an adverse mechanism whereby 
decreasing procurement and modernization generate increased maintenance costs. 
Aging has been a major O&S cost driver over the past decade. An August 2001 
regression analysis by the Congressional Budget Office states that O&S costs increased 
by one percent for each additional year of average age for the Air Force aircraft, and 2.4 
percent for Navy aircraft [Ref. 5]. 
Between 1980 and 2000, the average age of Navy aircraft rose from 11 to 16 
years, the age of Air Force aircraft increased from 13 to 20 years, and the average age of 
the Army’s helicopter fleet increased by 70 percent during this period   [Ref. 6]. Bob 
Ernst, Head of the Naval Air Systems Command, said [Ref. 7]: 
The average age of our in-flight refueling and maritime surveillance 
aircraft is about 29 years. If they were cars in Maryland, they would 
qualify for historic license plates. 
The most efficient way to fight the Death Cycle to prevent a possible catastrophe 
in the future is to increase procurement funding substantially. This must be done through 
Congressional appropriations or by devising strategies to relieve O&S cost pressures. 
DoD established the R-TOC pilot programs to identify methods to shift funding from 














































Figure 5. Death Cycle. 
 
C. WHAT ARE R-TOC PILOT PROGRAMS? 
The concept of R-TOC was already in place long before the R-TOC pilot 
programs were established. Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) followed by 
Section 912 c studies both emphasized reducing the total ownership cost of DoD weapon 
systems. Section 816 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1998 provided the 
final outcome of Section 912c studies, in which OSD was required to submit an action 
plan to Congress to streamline DoD acquisition. 
Section 816 required DoD to designate 10 major weapon programs to collect and 
report data on O&S costs and to figure out appropriate ways to increase product 
reliability and readiness. To broaden these efforts at controlling O&S costs and 
11 
increasing the reliability and readiness of weapon systems, DoD designated 10 programs 
from each service, a total of 30 programs. DoD would track these programs under the 
name of “R-TOC Pilot Programs.” Out of these 30 R-TOC pilot programs, only 10 would 
be reported to Congress. However, all of these programs would participate in the Pilot 
Program Forums held on a quarterly basis. 
The pilot program effort is used in three phases. In the first phase, the pilot 
programs prepared strategies, measures of effectiveness and their baselines. The second 
phase is implementation and testing of their strategies. The third phase will start at the 
beginning of FY2003 and finish at the end of FY 2005,and involves transferring these 
pilot strategies weapon systems strategies for the entire DoD. Figure 6 shows the 
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Table 3. R-TOC Pilot Programs. 
 
A more detailed overview of each pilot program follows. The data is derived 
from program websites, GAO reports and various journals and hearings. 
1. AH-64 Apache Helicopter 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded System 
Strategy: Recapitilization 
Service: Army 
The Apache is the U.S. Army’s main gunship/antitank helicopter whose life cycle 
is extending out to 2029. The original planned logistics sustainment of the Apache pilot 
program was Prime Vendor Support (PVS). PVS would have made the manufacturer, 
Boeing, responsible for sustaining and modernizing the aircraft by shifting the 
management of spare parts to them. PVS was based on the concept of “power by the 
hour,” with the Army paying a flat fee for each helicopter flight hour. The plan had 
assumed savings of $2 billion over 20 years, under which the contractor team would 
assume responsibility for all repair and maintenance activities, which was then called 
“nose-to-tail” care for the entire Apache fleet. The goal of “nose-to-tail” was to upgrade 
the helicopter during periodical maintenance and repairs. However, the Army Working 
13 
Capital Fund, which used to manage the spare parts, stood to lose at least $50 million as a 
result of this plan. This would jeopardize other Army programs and, as a result, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) dropped the PVS approach, and did not 
turnover responsibility for spare parts from the Army Working Capital Fund [Ref. 8]. The 
Apache pilot program’s current primary effort is directed towards focused 
recapitalization. Apache program’s R-TOC solutions include material improvements, 
diagnostic enhancements, maintenance procedures, and training [Ref. 9]. 
2. M-1 Abrams Tank 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded System 
Strategy: Contractor Logistic Support (CLS), Public/Private Partnering 
Service: Army 
M-1 Abrams is the U.S. Army’s main battle tank. The Abram’s engine and its 
mean time between failures has been a substantial concern influencing its readiness and a 
burdensome Operation and Support cost driver for the Army. The primary activities of 
this program are to improve reliability and decrease O&S costs through Performance 
Based Logistics Support. The Army plans four initiatives to improve reliability and 
maintainability: 
• Partner with industry to overhaul engine components using contractor 
parts and technical support with Government labor and facilities. 
• Reduce fuel consumption by 30 percent and increase reliability through an 
engine replacement program. 
• Implement a technical support program to identify and replace obsolete 
parts, improve safety and provide post-deployment software support. 
• Streamline the process for providing spare and repaired parts to the field 
through direct-vendor delivery, electronic data interchange and electronic 
commerce. 
As part of this pilot program, Anniston Army Depot and General 
Dynamics have formed a partnership to rebuild the M1A1 and to extend its 
service life out to 30 years. 
3. Comanche 
Life Cycle Phase: Developmental 
Strategy: Design for reduced O&S costs 
Service: Army 
14 
The Comanche helicopter program started in 1983 and is still in the 
developmental phase. Full production is planned to start in 2006 and projected to 
continue up to 2028. 
The R-TOC efforts of this program can be summarized as a design to reduce O&S 
costs. The Comanche will replace AH-64D aircraft, and it is projected to incur 53% less 
O&S LCC than the AH-64D [Ref. 10]. A June 21, 2001 GAO report states that the 
Comanche program faces significant risks related to cost overruns, scheduling delays, 
and degraded performance, and recommends that the program should make effective 
cost, schedule and performance trade-off decisions. 
4. CH-47 Chinook Helicopter 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded system 
Strategy: Reducing non-hardware cost drivers 
Expected FY 2005 Cost Reduction: 
The primary objective of this program is to develop an objective data system. The 
Army is refining a database to precisely measure operation and support costs and 
helicopter downtime by improved data collection and upgraded technical manuals and 
training [Ref.11]. 
5. Crusader 
Life Cycle Phase: Developmental (Canceled in May 2002) 
Strategy: Design for reduced O&S costs 
Service: Army 
The engine replacement program for the Abrams was also extended to the 
Crusader through the Abrams-Crusader Common Engine Program to reduce the O&S 
costs of both programs. The Crusader had been undergoing major restructuring to reduce 
the size and weight of the artillery system, and Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld 
officially canceled the program in May 2002. 
6. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded system with developmental components 
Strategy: Reducing Personnel costs by consolidating in-use systems, CLS               
Service: Army 
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AFATDS is a tactical data system for field artillery and provides integrated, 
automatic fire support for planning, coordinating, and controlling all fire support assets. 
The system also supports counter fire, interdiction, and suppression of enemy targets for 
close and deep operations [Ref. 12]. 
The primary R-TOC activity is to develop tactical management of both 
acquisition and legacy systems. The Army program team has been established to 
coordinate development of new systems with the support of the existing legacy systems 
to avoid duplication and to ensure interoperability between the new and legacy systems. 
The objective is to reduce operation and support costs by 20 percent by 2005 through 
increasing reliability and competitive sourcing of product support.  
7. Guardrail Common Sensor 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded system 
Strategy: Performance based arrangements 
Service: Army 
Guardrail is a corps-level, fixed wing airborne signals intelligence collection and 
target location system that provides real time targeting information to corps, division, and 
joint land force component commanders throughout the battlefield. The program will 
review all current contracts with support providers, including contractors, DLA inventory 
control points, and depots, to determine performance type and identify those appropriate 
for performance based contracting. Since Guardrail integrates many separately 
developed, technically sophisticated subsystems, it does not fit completely into the 
Army’s traditional support structure for sustaining weapons. To provide better support for 
the systems and the forces that rely on them, the Army has established teams of 
stakeholders and established various agreements with these teams concerning the 
operational performance of the system. 
8. Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMMT) 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded system 
Strategy: Performance based contract partnership, Use of commercial products 
Service: Army 
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The HEMMT program involves a family of 10-ton truck variants. It has been 
procured as a Non Developmental Item (NDI) since 1981. Ninety-five percent (95%) of 
HEMMT parts are DLA managed .The primary R-TOC activity is to establish a 
Performance Based contract partnership between DLA and the Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM). The Army intends to upgrade about 30% of its heavy truck fleet 
through an extended service program agreement between Oshkosh Truck Corporation 
and the Red River Army Depot. The program manager is applying an extended service 
program using commercial technologies to improve vehicle performance and reduce costs 
by the replacing high-failure-rate items. An award fee is being arranged with the 
contractor, covering operations and support performance. New interactive electronic 
technical manuals are being developed, and direct vendor delivery arrangements are 
being made with DLA to reduce inventories, achieve price reductions, and improve cycle 
times [Ref. 13]. 
9. HIMARS Multiple Launch Rocket System  
Life Cycle Phase: Developmental system 
Strategy: Total System Support Responsibility (TSPR), long-term contracts 
Service: Army 
The HIMARS multiple launch rocket system is still in development. The first 
EMD Launcher was delivered in November 2001. 
 The program is scheduled for fielding in 2005. The prime contractor is 
responsible for life cycle management. The Army is coordinating with the users as well 
as logistics support personnel to reduce total ownership costs and expects several 
initiatives to have a direct impact on the service’s ability to control costs with the 
currently fielded multiple launch rocket systems [Ref 14]. 
10. Tube-launched Optically-Controlled Wire-Guided Improved Target 
Acquisition System (TOW ITAS) 
Life Cycle Phase: In production 
Strategy: CLS 
Service: Army 
The Army is managing a fixed-price support contract for supply and maintenance, 
which will tie the contractor’s profit to the weapons’ readiness level. The ITAS 
Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) is established to provide for wholesale supply and 
depot maintenance support for the system’s life cycle. At the organizational and direct 
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support levels, soldiers perform all maintenance and supply functions using standard 
Army processes and procedures. The ITAS program is expected to reduce total 
ownership costs of the TOW system by reducing the number of components to be 
supported and eliminating support equipment and scheduled maintenance [Ref. 15]. 
11. The Standoff Land Attack Missile - Expanded Response (SLAMM-
ER) 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded System 
Strategy: Commercial Off-the-shelf (COTS) Components 
Service: Navy 
The SLAMM-ER R-TOC effort is focused on reducing TOC primarily in the 
production phase, and secondly in operation and maintenance costs, which accounts for 
the majority of the system total ownership costs. By using commercial components, 
decreasing the number of parts, restructuring maintenance and establishing a commercial 
depot alongside the production facility, the Marine Corps plans to reduce annual 
operation and support costs [Ref. 16]. 
12. Aviation Support Equipment (ASE) 
Life Cycle Phase: Mixture of fielded, developmental and production systems 
Strategy: Performance Based Logistic support 
Service: Navy 
The Aviation Support Equipment (ASE) program is focused on performance 
based logistics support with incentives for improving O&S costs and reliability. The 
Navy is incorporating the best practices of many supply support programs into one. The 
program’s goal is to improve reliability and to reduce supply chain response times while 
reducing overall costs [ref 17]. 
13. H-60 Helicopter 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded System with New Models in Development 
Strategy: Virtual Prime Vendor Support, upgrading 
Service: Navy 
The H-60 pilot program is focused on reducing logistics requirements by 
consolidating makes and models. The Navy is reducing the logistics infrastructure for its 
fleet of helicopters by reducing the number of models from seven to one basic airframe 
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with three variants. Under the overarching Helo Master Plan [Ref. 18], implemented by 
the H-60 program, the Navy will turn to Virtual Prime Vendor support for parts and 
material for all levels of maintenance as well as remanufacturing. By 2005, the Navy 
expects to cut operation and maintenance costs for the fleet by about 35 percent. 
14. EA-6B Prowler 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded system 
Strategy: Virtual Prime Vendor 
Service: Navy 
The key R-TOC activity can be defined as reliability centered maintenance and 
performance based support agreements. The Defense Logistics Agency is pursuing a 
virtual prime-vendor contract for engine parts. This program’s main objective is to 
explore a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with fleet customers to identify 
responsibilities and agree upon aircraft inventory and readiness metrics. The MOU would 
provide increased insight into the factors degrading readiness [Ref. 19]. 
15. AAAV 
Life Cycle Phase: Developmental system 
Strategy: Contractor Logistics Support 
Service: Marine Corps 
The Advanced Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAAV) is focused on up-front 
logistics investment and design for producibility efforts. The program is conducting 
design and supportability trade studies, and producibility assessments. Reducing the 
range and the depth of inventory is one of the main objectives. This program is still in the 
developmental phase, and savings estimates will not be available until 2004 [ref 20]. 
16. MTVR 
Life Cycle Phase: In production 
Strategy: Contractor Logistics Support 
Service: Marine Corps 
The Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) program is currently in Low 
Rate Initial Production (LRIP), after awarding a five-year multi-year contract. The 
Marine Corps expects savings of about $30 million on repairs and reduced inventory 
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through electronic commerce, electronic data interchange and direct vendor delivery 
agreements with the prime contractor [Ref. 21]. 
17. Common Ship 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded systems 
Strategy: Technology insertion, reengineered maintenance to reduce manpower. 
Service: Navy 
The Common Ship program focuses on maintenance problem areas common to 
ships throughout the entire fleet, rather than those associated with only one particular ship 
class or type. The primary R-TOC effort is defined as the reduction of O&S costs while 
improving Quality of Life (QOL). This program includes initiatives designed to open 
product support to competition, and to modernize ships by upgrading spare parts and 
components. As of April 2002, Common Ship initiatives impacted 217 ships and 27 new 
products have been introduced into the fleet, such as Anti-stain paints, magnetic 
couplings for shipboard alignments, and various hand tools [Ref. 22]. 
18. LPD-17 
Life Cycle Phase: In production 
Strategy: Contractor Logistic Support 
Service: Navy 
The LPD-17 class carrier program is the planned functional replacement for four 
classes of amphibious ships. First ship delivery is expected at the end of 2003. LPD 
projects $4.5 billion (FY 1996 dollars) O&S Cost Avoidance through design initiatives. 
They are developing a PBL implementation plan, and expect to achieve savings totaling 
in billions of dollars for the entire program by contracting out most of the logistics 
support. The actual cost data incurred by this program will not be available until 2005, 
and anticipated savings have been removed from the program budget [Ref. 23]. 
19. CVN-68 Nimitz Class Aircraft Carrier 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded System 
Strategy: Cost reduction through improving Quality of Life (QOL). 
Service: Navy 
The goal of the CVN-68 class ships program is to reduce TOC on aircraft carriers 
by reducing maintenance and improving reliability. The Navy anticipates substantial 
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savings by using improved paints and coatings, zero maintenance composite vent screens, 
composite impellers, and split mechanical seals. The current program savings are not 
incorporated into the program budget. 
20. AEGIS Cruiser 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded system 
Strategy: Technology insertion, Virtual Prime Vendor Support 
Service: Navy 
The AEGIS R-TOC program was initiated to identify innovative SMARTSHIP 
technologies to reduce manpower requirements and equipment life cycle costs and, at the 
same time, increase ship performance and reliability. The Aegis Cruiser fleet’s TOC 
baseline cost is estimated to be $72.9 billion over a 35-year service life (FY 2000 dollar). 
This program identified five initiatives, including: SMARTSHIP integrated ship controls; 
all-electric modification; stern flap; wireless technology; and advanced food service. 
These initiatives are projected to yield $57.6 million cost avoidance by FY2005 [Ref. 24]. 
21. F-16 Fighter Falcon 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded system 
Strategy: Supplier performance agreements 
Service: Air Force 
The key R-TOC initiative of this program is a Combined Life-Time Support 
Concept. The program assumes a Firm Fixed Price (FPP) contract that provides 
incentives for the contractors to build more reliable components. The F-16 was one of 
four R-TOC Pilot Programs designated to experiment with performance agreements with 
users, performance agreements for support providers, and program-specific working 
capital funds. The F-16 program developed a Memorandum of Understanding MOU, 
which was signed between the System Program Office (SPO) and the Air Combat 
Command (ACC) on 26 June 01. The Air Force has established performance-based 
agreements with the suppliers and shifted responsibility for total logistics sustainment 
over certain avionics upgrades to the contractors. [Ref. 25] 
22. Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)  
Life Cycle Phase: Developmental System with Fielded Components 
Strategy: Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) analyzes, TSPR 
21 
Service: Air Force 
The goals of the Space Based Infrared System are R-TOC savings and increased 
visibility of O&M costs by shifting the Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) 
to the contractor. The SBIRS program gives the contractor responsibility for virtually 
everything, except operating the system 
The retirement and consolidation of old systems is the main concern for future 
O&M cost reductions [Ref. 26]. 
23. C-5 Galaxy 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded System 
Strategy: Virtual Prime Vendor with DLA and prime contractor 
Service: Air Force 
The C-5 heavy transport aircraft program expects to improve aircraft reliability 
and reduce overall O&S costs by incorporating an Avionics Modernization Program 
(AMP) to upgrade avionics, and a re-engining program to use commercial off the shelf 
engines.  
The program’s objectives are to extend operational life to 2040, increase fleet 
availability and reduce Total Ownership Cost $53.9 million by FY 2005 [Ref. 27]. 
24. F-117A Nighthawk 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded system 
Strategy: Contractor is given total system performance responsibility 
Service: Air Force 
The F-117A Nighthawk program uses a Total System Performance Responsibility 
(TSPR) contract. The contractor, Lockheed Martin Skunk Works, is completely 
responsible for supporting the F-117s. The TSPR contract is a Cost Plus Incentive Fee 
and Award Fee contract. Cost savings are shared 50/50 between the contractor and the 
Government, in case the savings are incurred from contractor–initiated actions. In FY01, 
the program had already generated $27.8 million in savings [Ref. 28]. 
25. K-135 Tanker Aircraft 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded System  
Strategy: COTS electronics upgrade with 10-year warranty 
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Service: Air Force 
The K-135 has a fleet size of 585 Aircraft in 40 worldwide bases with an average 
age of 41 years. 
 The key R-TOC activity of this program is to reduce the frequency of depot 
maintenance and to reduce the costs of Depot Level Reparables (DLRs) by replacing 
obsolete, low reliable equipment with Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) equipment and 
prolonged warranties. The system TOC is estimated at $2.4 billion per year. The program 
assumes a cost reduction of $886 million by FY05. 
The program has identified 27 initiatives to date, of which only eight have been 
funded by the Air Force [Ref. 29]. 
26. Cheyenne Mountain  
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded system  
Strategy: Total System Performance Responsibility  
Service: Air Force 
The Cheyenne Mountain Complex (CMC) consists of 24 communications, 
processing, and display systems. The CMC receives input from sensors located 
throughout the world to track air breathing and space borne vehicles and objects for 
decision-makers at both the National Command Authority and the Combatant 
Commander level. This program established a TSPR contract under the name of 
Integrated Space Command and Control Contract (ISC2) with the contractor, Lockheed 
Martin Mission Systems (LMMS). Under this contract, the Air Force transferred all 
logistics support to LMMS. The contractor integrates support for the complex in 
conjunction with Cheyenne’s operations [Ref. 30]. 
27. C-17 Globemaster  
Life Cycle Phase: In production 
Strategy: Flexible Sustainment 
Service: Air Force 
The C-17 Cargo aircraft program has implemented the “Flexible Sustainment” 
contract on a trial basis. Flexible Sustainment is an interim support strategy utilizing a 
performance-based contract, measuring key system-level metrics. Goals include 
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improved readiness through better data management; reduced operation and support costs 
through proactive management, based on reliability analysis and technology 
improvement; partnering between industry and the Government; and manufacturer 
performance warranties [Ref. 31]. 
28. Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded system, in production 
Strategy: Contractor Total System Support Responsibility (TSSR) 
Service: Air Force 
The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) program utilizes a 
sole-source system integration and support contract. The contractor, Northrop Grumman, 
is given total system support responsibility using a 6-year contract, with 22-year award 
term incentive. The contractor provides complete systems’ logistics support. The Air 
Force, however, still maintains budgeting, contracting, requirements development and 
engineering authority. Northrop Grumman integrates all sustainment activities and has 
insight into those activities it does not directly manage, mostly using simulation models. 
JSTARS O&S Life Cycle Cost (LCC) was calculated as $9.114 billion, and the program 
projects a $2.278 billion (FY 1998 dollars) O&S LCC cost reduction [Ref. 32]. 
29. Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded systems 
Strategy: Replacement of low-reliability components and sub-systems 
Service: Air Force 
The AWACS Program has a relatively small fleet compared to the other Pilot 
Programs. It has a fleet of 32 operational aircraft.  
This program identified two main initiatives: 
• Diminishing Manufacturing Resources/Material Shortages (DMS/MS) 
Database 
• Pinpoint II Tester 
DMS/DM Database is an Oracle-based database tool to track, forecast and 
identify alternative part sources to mitigate DMS/DM problems. 
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Pinpoint II Tester diagnoses the faults in the circuit cards. It is more effective than 
the legacy tester, thereby increasing aircraft availability. [Ref. 33] 
30. B-1 Lancer 
Life Cycle Phase: Fielded system 
Strategy: Wide range of cost-reduction initiatives 
Service: Air Force 
This program will update the B1-B long-range strategic bomber. As a part of the 
R-TOC efforts, a Cost Reduction Integrated Product Team (CRIPT) was established to 
identify, track, and document the champion cost reduction initiatives. The R-TOC 
approach consists of various cost-reduction initiatives. The Air Force is establishing 
service-level agreements (SLAs) with all organic supply-chain managers, which will 
yield metrics for the Air Force to define responsibilities and measure the program’s 
performance. Under a long term partnering agreement, the Air Force expects to improve 
aircraft readiness and reduce operation and support costs through improved information 
and supply chain management [Ref. 34]. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the development of the R-TOC pilot programs and the 
need for establishing them. It also defined the strategies and initiatives identified by these 
programs. 
The next chapter will outline the general research strategy, and present the 
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III. DATA PRESENTATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the general research strategy used for this thesis as well as 
the researcher’s findings.  These findings are displayed in two subparts called GAO 
findings and survey results. 
B. GENERAL RESEARCH STRATEGY 
A comprehensive review of current literature was the principal research method 
used to answer the research questions, and focused on GAO reports, Pilot Program 
briefings and Quarterly Pilot Program Minutes. 
In addition to the examination of current literature, the researcher also developed 
and administered a survey to a sample of Pilot Program officials. The Pilot Program 
officials responsible for the of total ownership cost reduction initiatives were targeted as 
the points of contacts when the survey was disseminated.  Out of 25 requests, 13 
addressed these R-TOC officials, eight addressed Deputy Program Managers and four 
addressed Program Managers.  Of the 25 points of contacts receiving the survey, six 
participated.  The response rate was 24%. 
The participants were informed that this study would not address the performance 
of any individuals in the R-TOC Pilot Programs, but would ask questions concerning 
DoD overall.  Therefore, the names of the participants would not be revealed, although 
their contact information will be kept in case it is necessary to contact them again.  
C. RESEARCH DATA PRESENTATION 
1. GAO Findings 
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A June 2000 GAO report, “Actions Needed to Enhance Success of Reengineering 
Initiatives,” states that DoD will likely encounter problems in deriving benefits from the 
R-TOC pilot programs.  The report points out that pilot programs have multiple program- 
specific objectives.  Therefore, it will be very difficult to link the results into an 
overarching plan that integrates these individual efforts into a single department-wide 
implementation strategy.  This report also emphasizes that the current R-TOC 
implementation schedule is overly optimistic.  The report identifies the problem areas in 
implementing R-TOC as below: [Ref. 35] 
• The transfer of inventory to contractors: the contractors will be reluctant to 
purchase overvalued DoD inventory  
• Funding: These programs need significant up-front investment.  However, 
DoD has not developed a budget plan to fund these investments.  It is very 
likely that Program Managers will not receive the necessary funds.  
Moreover, Program Managers do not have complete control over the O&S 
costs.  Some O&S funding should be transferred from Combat Commands 
to PMs. 
In September 2000, GAO released a report, “Higher Priority needed for Army 
O&S Reduction Efforts,” stating that the Army will likely not be able to significantly 
lower the high O&S costs that have reduced the amount of money available for 
modernizing its weapon systems.  The report states that the “vicious cycle” will likely 
continue in the Army.  Two deficient areas in the Army’s R-TOC program are [Ref. 36]: 
• The lack of assigned accountability and specific cost reduction goals for 
each system 
• The lack of data.  The Army was said not to be collecting data on all 
elements of the O&S costs of weapon systems 
The Army responded that its efforts to track all O&S costs are still in the 
developmental stage, and as the lessons learned from their R-TOC initiatives are 
identified, a more accurate accountability of weapon systems O&S costs may result. 
In October 2000, GAO released another report, “Risks in Operation and 
Maintenance and Procurement Programs,” which states that DoD is unable to shift funds 
to Modernization and Readiness through infrastructure reductions, and warns that DoD 
may not produce the projected savings during the 2000-2005 timeframe, because the 
initiatives are long term efforts and require huge up-front investments.  This report also 
states that DoD places higher priority on its current obligations, and therefore, 
procurement funding migrates to O&S costs [Ref. 37]. 
In May 2001, GAO issued another report entitled “Integrated Approach, 
Accountability, and Incentives are Keys to Effective Reform.” This report stated that 
DoD’s cost reduction effort lacks complete and accurate overall life cycle cost 
information for weapon systems, and therefore, it is impossible to determine the 
performance of these efforts [Ref. 38]. 
28 
In September 2001, GAO issued another report entitled “Air Force Lacks Data to 
Assess Contractor Logistics Support Approaches.” This report states that Air Force pilot 
programs are unlikely to provide the information needed to evaluate their cost 
effectiveness.  The GAO’s reasoning is that the Air Force did not perform a cost benefit 
analysis prior to its decision to use contractors to support their weapon systems.  
Therefore, the Air Force does not have sufficient data to determine whether or not the 
logistics support provided by the contractors achieved their cost and performance 
expectations [Ref. 39]. 
In February 2002, GAO issued another report, “Opportunities to Improve the 
Army’s and the Navy’s Decision Making Process for Weapon System Support,” which 
states that R-TOC pilot programs are unlikely to provide the data needed to compare the 
initial expectations with the results.  This report, as did the previous report on Air Force 
pilot programs, states that the Army and the Navy do not have sufficient data to assess 
the cost effectiveness of the proposed contractor support initiatives [Ref. 40]. 
2. Survey Results 
Thirteen questions were asked to extract data for analysis.  The questions, as well 
as the responses received, follow. 
Question 1: What is your personal vision of the DoD R-TOC Pilot Programs 
and their future? 
Response: Out of six participants, five stated that the R-TOC pilot efforts will be 
a winner.  Only one respondent was neutral.  A great deal of trust in future successes 
appeared to be the general trend.  However, one respondent pointed out that these future 
successes are built on the hypothesis that OSD will continue advocating R-TOC.  Some 
respondents stated that R-TOC is great because it forces PMs to consider TOC in their 
programs, helps to identify obstacles, and encourages cost saving initiatives.  The one 
neutral respondent emphasized that it is not possible to see what will happen in the future, 
as these programs are pilots, and there is still insufficient data to favor or disfavor them.  
Five of the respondents stated that the R-TOC pilot program concept is beneficial and 
should be extended to all DoD programs. 
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Question 2: What are the advantages and disadvantages of being a R-TOC 
Pilot Program? 
Response: The advantages and disadvantages are stated below: 
• Advantages: 
• Increases program visibility to obtain funding for system specific 
initiatives 
• Provides a forum for identifying issues that adversely affect R-
TOC efforts by voicing their problems and concerns to the officials 
most able to assist them 
• Provides an opportunity to prove a concept that may be beneficial 
to DoD as a whole 
• Disadvantages 
• Additional workload developing and maintaining a R-TOC plan 
and cost data consumes the already insufficient resources 
• Being held accountable for all elements of a program that influence 
total ownership costs 
Question 3: Is there a clear and concise DoD policy or tool showing how to 
format and start a TOC reduction initiative? 
Response: All of the respondents agreed that there is no clear and concise DoD 
policy or tool.  Each service has developed various different approaches to documenting 
R-TOC initiatives.  The Army, Navy and Air Force have developed different formats for 
their PMs to use when submitting an R-TOC initiative for funding, and evaluation and 
prioritization of these various initiatives depends on the services’ own sets of rules.  One 
respondent stated: 
There are many different TOC programs available and all have their own 
unique format; likewise Value Engineering (VE); Reliability, 
Maintainability and Sustainability (RM&S); and Total Ownership Cost 
Reduction.  Some of these formats stay constant.  Some, like Total 
Ownership Cost Reductions, tend to change from year to year. 
Question 4: How do you incentivize your staff to share their ideas and come 
up with cost saving ideas? 
Response: The majority of the respondents were from R-TOC teams of the pilot 
programs.  Since it is their job to develop R-TOC initiatives, they stated that they did not 
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have motivational concerns.  However, all of the respondents emphasized that for others 
in the Program Offices, it is very challenging to develop ideas that will achieve savings in 
their programs.  One respondent stated that: 
In our program, some of our initiatives were to modernize, to improve 
readiness, and to fight obsolescence.  These initiatives were also reducing 
ownership costs.  We killed two birds with one stone. 
Another respondent pointed out that participating/competing in the OSD PBD 
721, which funds cost avoidance investment initiatives based on their ROI, is a good 
incentive. 
The majority of the respondents emphasized that they are hosting an O&S 
seminar once or twice a year to discuss methods to reduce O&S costs. 
Question 5: How many initiatives has your program identified so far; how 
many of these identified initiatives were funded? 
Response: The respondents replied that among the initiatives that they had 
identified, many of them required no funding.  One respondent pointed out that they are 
not submitting every initiative that they have identified.  After analysis, some of them fail 
to meet the minimum requirements to be submitted. 
One respondent stressed that although their initiatives have been funded once, 
subsequent budget decisions might reduce the scope of several of their initiatives. 
Question 6: What are the metrics measuring the dollar effect of your TOC 
reduction initiatives? 
Response: In all of the R-TOC programs, except those in the developmental 
phase, O&S savings in each year is measured against a constant Fiscal Year O&S 
baseline. 
The respondents identified some other subordinate metrics to measure the dollar 
effect of their R-TOC initiatives: 
• Reduction in cost per mile to operate 
• Decrease in order/ship time 
• Reduction in numbers of component failures (increase in MTBF) 
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• Comparison of costs for baseline programs to the costs for the initiatives 
All the above metrics are measured over a long, specific period of time, usually 
10 years or more. 
Question 7: Does your R-TOC program have a gain-sharing policy among 
Government and the contractor? If yes, what is it based on? 
Response: Out of six respondents, only one responded that there is a gain-sharing 
policy in place between the Government and the contractor.  This respondent replied that 
that their Value Engineering program allows the contractor to share in any savings 
realized by incorporating a Value Engineering Change Proposal (VECP).  In essence, the 
sharing of savings is the contractor’s incentive to develop the VECP with his own funds.  
The gain-sharing ratio is decided in accordance with the incentive sharing rates stated in 
FAR Subpart 52.248. 
Question 8: Do you have insight into the R-TOC practices of industry, or 
other foreign and domestic programs? 
Response: All respondents replied that they only have insight into domestic DoD 
programs.  One respondent stated that he also has a limited insight into the industry 
practices to reduce total ownership costs. 
Question 9: Do you think that the current PPBS system is an obstacle to 
promote R-TOC? 
Response: One respondent emphasized that it was not the PBBS, but the policy 
execution within PPBS that is the obstacle to promoting R-TOC efforts.  The respondents 
stated several concerns: 
• Single year appropriation makes long term commitment nearly impossible 
• There are too many “colors of money” 
• The services lack discipline in the Operation and Maintenance accounts 
• PMs are held accountable for cost avoidance saving estimates without 
program stability for initiative investment 
 
Question 10: Do you think that the PM turnover is an obstacle to promoting 
R-TOC initiatives? 
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Response: Only one respondent stated that PM turnover is an obstacle.  The 
remainder felt that there were not any problems with PM turnover regarding O&S costs.  
One respondent pointed out that a civilian Deputy and staff that provide program 
continuity mitigate the issue of PM turnover. 
Question 11: Do you believe that the TOC reduction of 10% for legacy and 
20% for new systems until 2005 is a realistic goal? 
Response: There were various responses to this question.  One answered “no,” 
two answered “it depends,” and the remaining three answered “yes”.  Those answering 
“yes” pointed out that they had already realized these goals, assuming all of their cost 
projections are accurate.  The two respondents answering, “it depends,” pointed out that it 
depends on how you define your savings.  One respondent stated: “It is probably realistic 
if measured on a saving per unit basis; but if measured in terms of overall fleet cost 
reduction, probably not.” 
One respondent pointed out that his PMO has a very large and aging fleet in the 
field, and hardware improvements reducing O&S costs can take a long time to show any 
effects. For example, O&S cost reductions can take over 10 years to really begin to make 
a difference from a fleet standpoint. 
Question 12: Is your Program exceeding this goal or falling behind? 
Response: Only two respondents stated they are falling behind while the 
remaining four stated that they are either on track or exceeding this goal. 
Figure 7 is from an article by Dr. Spiros Pallas of the Strategic and Tactical 
Systems Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 





Figure 7. Projected Savings for Pilot Programs. 
 
In Figure 7, five of the pilot programs were not reported because they are in the 
acquisition phase and excluded from calculations because they have no actual O&S costs. 
Question 13: What are the main obstacles to promoting R-TOC in DoD 
services? 
Response: The common problems of the respondents are listed below: 
• Color of money and one year restrictions in O&M accounts 
• Insufficient funding 
• Lack of PM control over O&M accounts 
• Difficulty of funding sustaining engineering analysis for systems once the 
system is out of production 
• Concern that cost savings and cost avoidances will be removed from the 
budget before they have been validated or realized 
• Complexity of tracking the actual cost of O&S 




D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the general research strategy, and presented the researcher’s 
findings on R-TOC. 


























































































This chapter analyzes the problems hampering the efficiency of the R-TOC Pilot 
Programs in the following four areas:  
• Concept development  
• Budgeting  
• Laws 
• Tools 
1. Concept Development 
a. Milestones  
R-TOC pilot programs were initiated to gather data to develop future 
department-wide strategies and policy changes by the end of 2005.  DoD implementation 
was thus foreseen by the end of FY2002.  The R-TOC test results from all programs will 
be evaluated and the results of successful implementations will be transferred to all DoD 
systems before the end of FY2005.  However, only 25 of the pilot programs will have 
submitted their performance results when this thesis is finalized, as programs such as 
HIMARS, AAAV, SBIRS, and Comanche are still in their developmental phases and 
their R-TOC implementation plans either have not yet been developed or are subject to 
changes.  Similarly, the Crusader program will not provide performance results, because 
the program has been cancelled. 
Considering none of these five programs will be able to submit their 
savings estimates before FY2004, DoD will not have all the hoped-for information to 
meet its milestone to begin a department-wide R-TOC plan by the end of FY2002. 
b. Too Much Diversification 
Some of the pilot program initiatives are extremely program-specific and 
it will be impractical to transfer their results to a department-wide implementation plan.  
These programs seem to focus mainly on achieving cost savings, and not to develop cost 
savings concepts.  Therefore, they may not provide meaningful results to develop a 
department-wide policy.  
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For example, some programs such as Abrams, the H-60, F-117 and 
SBIRS, are mixed efforts.  Abrams involves both a public-private partnership and engine 
replacement. The H-60 involves both consolidating of various models and DVD supply 
contract efforts.  The F-117 involves both implementing a Total System Performance 
Responsibility (TSPR) contract and other cost reduction initiatives, such as downsizing 
the program office.  SBIRS involves both CAIV analyses and consolidating of old 
systems.  However, these programs have not developed a methodology to differentiate 
each of their initiative’s effects on cost savings.   
 





Abrams + + + 
CH-47 + +  
Comanche + + + 
Crusader +  + 
 AFATDS +   
Guardrail +  + 
HEMTT + + + 
HIMARS + + + 
TOW-ITAS   + 
Apache +   
AAAV + + + 
CG-47 Aegis Cruisers +   
Common Ship + +  
CVN-68 +   
EA-6B + + + 
H-60  + + + 
LPD-17 + + + 
MTVR +  + 
SLAM-ER  +  
ASE + + + 
AWACS + + + 
C-5 + +  
C-17 + + + 
C/KC-135 + + + 
Cheyenne Mountain +  + 
F-16 + + + 
F-117A + + + 
JSTARS +  + 
B-1 + + + 
 
Table 4. Composition of Pilot Program Approaches. 
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Table 4 shows the composition of different approaches to the R-TOC pilot 
programs.  Most of the pilot programs are a mixture of improvements in supportability 
and reliability and maintenance. The more mixed a system, the more difficult to manage 
cost data because the responsibility for acquiring cost data shifts to a wide range of other 
services, such as maintenance depots, software support facilities and operational bases. 
Therefore, it becomes harder to evaluate the effectiveness of each individual initiative 
and to produce statistically validated concepts. 
2. Funding  
Funding is a real concern when evaluating the efficiency of pilot programs. The 
main funding concerns are listed below. 
a. Lack of Program Manager Control in O&M Accounts 
In the DoD Acquisition environment, the unit commanders control O&S 
funds while program managers traditionally control acquisition funds.  This may be the 
most important problem hampering R-TOC efforts.  The desired goals and objectives of 
the R-TOC efforts cannot be realized without giving PMs the responsibility and authority 
for the entire system related to O&S costs.  Most R-TOC savings occur in the O&M 
account.  However, program managers tend to focus on RDT&E and production phases 
of the life cycle and not sustainment.  It is the latter area in which large O&S cost-savings 
usually occur.  
Policy guidance directs that all pilot programs exclude Military Personnel 
and fuel costs from their baseline calculations.  However, these accounts are the main 
cost drivers, and by not including them into the baseline calculations, pilot programs may 
not be addressing significant cost reductions.  
Figure 8 shows a typical O&S baseline calculation prepared by the C-5 
System Program Office (SPO), and presented at the 10th Quarterly Pilot Program Forum.  
This figure shows that SPO does not have direct control and authority for major areas of 
O&S costs.  Although the weapon system is projected to incur an annual baseline O&S 
cost of $1.2 billion, the C-5 SPO only has direct influence over $549 million.  Therefore, 
they used their directly controlled costs in establishing their baseline for the 20% OSD 
goal.  The C-5 program’s goal of a $109 million reduction in O&S costs by FY2005, in 




Air Crew                   36 
Flight Engineers       16 
Load Masters            20 
Maintenance             198 
Other Personnel        31 
 
Unit Level Consumption  
POL                         202 
Consumables           33 
DLRs                       189 
Depot Maintenance 
Airframe                 115 
Engine OH              214 
Contractor Support  
Total 17 
Sustaining Support 
Support Equipment 15 
Mod kits                    1  
Sustainment Engr.   10 
S/W Maintenance       6 
 
Indirect Support 
Personnel                 6 
Installation              90 









FY 05 R-TOC Goal
 
       $549 M 
X     20% 
 
$ 109 M 
Total O&S baseline 1.2 Billion 
SPO Controlled Cost $549M 
Figure 8. A Typical Baseline Calculation. 
 
b. PMs Do Not Get to Keep the Savings from R-TOC Initiatives  
There is no assurance that the PMs will be able to reinvest the R-TOC 
savings in their programs, which creates a disincentive for the PMs to dedicate all their 
resources to the R-TOC concepts.  DoD has not issued any policy directing that at least 
some portion of these R-TOC savings will be reinvested by the PMs.  
c. Funding Instability and Lack of Funding 
Funding instability is, in fact, a common problem not only for the pilot 
programs but also for all DoD programs.  There are various worthy R-TOC initiatives 
requiring a commitment of resources over the course of several years but funding is 
annually budgeted and may not continue to be funded over the required period. 
Pilot programs being initiated to identify efficient methods to nullify the 
“Death Cycle” effect should have some sort of funding priority. OSD established 
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additional funding under Program Budget Decision (PBD) 721 allocating $56M to fund 
the cost of economic and feasibility studies, environmental baselines and contractor 
support efforts.  Although this funding provided incentives for the Pilot Programs, its 
effect is very limited.  The $56 million comprises 0.04% of the O&M costs incurred in 
FY2002.  
3. Legislation  
There are various pilot programs such as F-117, C-17, and HIMARS, which are 
planned to test Total System Performance Responsibility approach. These programs are 
in place now and they didn’t report any legislative problems, though it is evident that 
there will be legislative issues when transferring the results of these initiatives into 
department-wide programs. The main legislative issues are listed below. 
10 U.S.C 2464 requires that core logistics be performed by Government owned 
and operated facilities.  However, the Secretary of Defense can waive the requirement 
and transfer the logistic support to the private sector in accordance with OMB Circular A-
76. 
10 U.S.C 2466 prohibits using more than 50-percent of funds in a fiscal year for 
depot-level maintenance and repair by non-Government personnel.  The Secretary of 
Defense can waive this requirement for a single fiscal year because of National Security 
concerns.  
10 U.S.C 2469 requires public-private competition before a depot-level activity is 
transferred to the private industry.  However, this kind of competition is almost 
impossible, considering the lack of metrics and the resources that should be allocated.  
An October 2002 GAO report, “Change in Reporting Practices and Requirements 
Could Enhance Congressional Oversight,” states that Air Force is already above the 50-
percent public/private depot-level maintenance split ceiling. This report shows that Army 
and Navy are also very close to this ceiling. The percentages of private workload dollars 
in FY2001 were 46.8% for Army, 45.6% for Navy and 51.9% for Air Force [Ref. 42]. 
This data indicates that transferring R-TOC on a depart-wide basis faces major challenges 
remaining under the 50-percent ceiling, unless Congress increases the allowed percentage 
of private depot maintenance work. 
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 4. Inefficient Tools 
The GAO reports discussed in Chapter III mostly criticize R-TOC programs for 
not having complete and accurate overall life cycle cost information. However, this is 
only true for the R-TOC programs that are still in the acquisition pipeline. For fielded 
systems, the baseline calculations are pretty realistic with only small inaccuracies because 
of problems in getting data on the indirect costs of system operation and support (O&S) 
costs. Pilot programs use three main databases to find their cost drivers and track savings.  
These databases furnish historical data for the Pilot Programs.  The Army uses the 
Operations and Support Management Information System (OSMIS), the Navy and the 
Marine Corps use the Visibility And Management of Operation and Support Costs 
(VAMOSC), and the Air Force uses the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC). 
However, developmental programs don’t have any actual O&S costs; therefore, they do 
not interface well with these information systems. For developmental systems, there 
aren’t all encompassing estimating tools suitable for performing tradeoffs and measuring 
savings. The baselines for these systems comprise engineering projections only; 
therefore, their credibility is unknown. 
B. PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF ACHIEVING DSAC GOALS 
The Defense System Affordability Council’s original goal was for Pilot programs 
to reduce O&S costs, less military personnel and fuel, 7% by FY2000, 10% by FY2002 
and 20% by FY2005, based on their FY1997 baselines.  FY2001-2005 Defense Planning 
Guidance omitted intermediate-year results.  All pilot programs are now required to 
achieve a 20% reduction in O&S costs by FY2005.  However, some of these pilot 
programs are still in the developmental phase and they do not have any actual O&S costs, 
but only projections, and are therefore excluded from this calculation.  
Figure 9 is prepared from the data presented by pilot program offices during 
Quarterly forums.  It might be construed that some pilot programs are not working 
effectively.  Although this can be misleading, as in the case of programs such as Abrams, 
which has a very large and aging fleet in the field; improvements that can reduce O&S 








































































Figure 9. Projected Saving for Pilot Programs. 
 
Table 5 shows the methodology used to prepare Figure 9.  The program offices’ 
projected cost savings are retrieved from their presentations delivered at Pilot Program 
Quarterly Forums, which are accessible via the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) 
homepage at http://rtoc.ida.org. 
Program %Savings by FY2005 Calculation Methodology 
Comanche 53  (Estimated saving/FY2005 baseline)*100 
MTVR 48  (Estimated saving in unit costs/baseline)*100 
CVN-68 27  Estimated Reduction compared to the replaced legacy system 
JSTARS 26  Program Office's projection 
C-17 23  Program Office's projection 
B-1 22.7  Program Office's projection 
Guardrail 20  Program Office's projection 
ASE 20  Program Office's projection 
Apache 18  Program Office's projection 
HEMTT 18.3  Program Office's projection 
C/KC-135 15.8  Program Office's projection 
AWACS 15.5  Program Office's projection 
H-60  13.4  (Estimated saving/baseline)*100 
AFATDS 12  Program Office's projection 
F-117A 10.6  (Estimated saving/baseline)*100 
C-5 10  Program Office's projection 
Abrams 8  Program Office's projection 
Common Ship 5  Program Office's projection 
F-16 5  (Estimated saving/baseline)*100 
CG-47 Aegis Cruisers 4.4  (Estimated saving/baseline)*100 
CH-47 -  Unavailable 
Crusader -  Unavailable 
HIMARS -  Unavailable 
TOW-ITAS -  Unavailable 
AAAV -  Unavailable 
EA-6B -  Unavailable 
LPD-17 -  Unavailable 
SLAM-ER -  Unavailable 
Cheyenne Mountain -  Unavailable 
SBIRS -  Unavailable 
Table 5. Backup Table for Figure 9. 
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C. LESSONS LEARNED 
The R-TOC pilot programs’ successes depend on how efficiently they will 
transfer their experiences to the hundreds of other DoD programs.  This sharing of 
“lessons learned” is now the highest priority for the R-TOC Working Group.  Each pilot 
program presents their “lessons learned” in the quarterly Pilot Program Forums, which 
are accessible via the Internet.  By creating a “lessons learned” database via the web, the 
R-TOC Working Group enables other PMs to conduct a broader range of cost saving 
analyses.  Every PC user with military access can share these “lessons learned” captured 
by the Pilot Programs at http://rtoc.ida.org. 
The lessons learned by the pilot programs will be reviewed using the same areas 
outlined in the beginning of this chapter.  




1. Concept Development 
a. Reliability and Maintenance (R&M) Improvements 
To maximize R-TOC savings, reliability, maintainability, and availability 
must be incorporated into the system design from the beginning.  When systems are in 
production or fielded, PMs have limited opportunity to improve reliability and 
maintenance, or reduce operation costs.  For legacy systems, implementing major 
modifications may capture O&S cost reductions, but it is arduous and expensive. 
Identifying and focusing on critical O&S cost drivers and readiness 
inhibitors may yield significant cost savings. For example, the LPD-17 program has 
identified the “Top 10 O&S Cost Avoidance Items.” By incorporating improvements of 
these factors into the design, the program plans to reduce sailor workload and improve 
quality of life, while achieving better performance and reducing the O&S costs. 
The installation of new sub-systems to increase capability may increase 
TOC in terms of training, maintenance, and hardware/software. 
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Low-density systems pose challenges such as poor economies of scale by 
distributing investment costs to a small number of weapon systems.  Programs that have a 
larger fleet incur larger acquisition costs, but R-TOC savings are also greater and the 
payback period is smaller than the low-density weapon systems. For, example AWACS 
program has a fleet of 32 aircraft spread over a wide geographical area. The AWACS 
program faces challenges to target initiatives that demonstrate a large enough savings to 
justify investments [Ref. 43]. 
b. Supply Chain Improvements 
Direct Vendor Delivery (DVD) contracts reduce logistics cycle time and 
O&S costs. For example,the HEMTT program awarded Oshkosh Truck Corporation a 
DVD contract in April 2000,which includes 1475 items. By August 2002, the price 
decreases on 1411 items added up to $3 million.The HEMTT program also cut the 
logistics cycle time by requiring Oshkosh Truck Corporation to deliver within 5 days via 
DVD. 
c. Competitive Product Support 
A gain-sharing policy for the contractor initiatives enhances R-TOC 
savings. For example, the F-117 program uses a 50/50 share between the Air Force and 
LM Aero for all savings beyond the 10% mandatory reduction in O&S costs required by 
the contract. The TSPR arrangement yielded under-runs of $3.9 million in 1999, $6.05 
million in 2000 and $5 million in the first six months of 2001. 
Adopting commercial products and procedures are effective in reducing 
O&S costs, where possible. For example, the ASE program uses a commercial 
maintenance agreement with Lockheed Martin Information Systems to support its 
Consolidated Automated Support System (CASS) systems, which requires 24-hour turn 
around time for high priority failures and 30-day turn-around time for routine 
transactions. This arrangement provides faster turn-around times for requisitions and 
reduced costs. The program also expects improved reliability via an incentive award fee. 
2. Funding 
Budget instability is a major inhibitor to enhancing the efficiency of R-TOC 
programs.  When resources allocated are not available, PMs cannot be held accountable 
for execution of their cost savings estimates. For example, Abrams program will be 
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reducing the original number of tanks for the AIM and PROSE initiatives due to 
instability in funding. This will also hamper Abrams program’s saving projections and R-
TOC plans. 
Additional funding sources, such as PBD 721, create incentives for innovative 
initiatives and result in significant R-TOC savings. For example,the Air Force is 
projecting $94.8 million savings by an $11.6 million PBD 721 investment through 
FY2000-2007 [Ref. 44]. 
R-TOC goals are more difficult to achieve because of the tendency to take savings 
away from the program achieving them. Incentivizing PMOs through shared savings 
might strengthen R-TOC. 
3. Law 
To enhance the benefits of competitive product support throughout all DoD 
weapon systems, some relief from the 50:50 rule and a narrower core logistics definition 
are required. As stated earlier, the services are currently operating very close the 50-
percent ceiling mandated in the law, and various R-TOC strategies like Total System 
Performance Responsibility (TSPR) and Public/Private partnering cannot be extended to 
other DoD programs within the limitation of this 50-percent ceiling. 
4. Tools 
The Visibility And Management of Operation and Support Costs (VAMOSC) 
databases have been converted into web-based data sources, so that program offices can 
perform R-TOC investment analysis and tradeoffs, and measure the impact of R-TOC 
savings via the Internet. 
D. BEST PRACTICES 
The best practices presented here have been chosen among many other best 
practices presented on the IDA website and pilot program briefings, because their 
impacts have been considered more significant. 
1. Concept Development 
a. Reliability and Maintenance (R&M) Improvements 
Program:  Abrams 
Initiative:  PROSE, AIM 
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PM Abrams has developed two initiatives to improve R&M.  The first 
initiative makes innovative use of a partnership with PM Abrams/Anniston Army 
Depot/Honeywell to overhaul the existing AGT 1500 engine.  This program is termed 
Partnership for Reduced O&S Costs, Engine (PROSE).  Under PROSE, the Government 
is teamed with Honeywell to reengineer the production process and improve field 
support.  Honeywell provides quality parts and expert technical support.  Honeywell is 
responsible for project management and project engineering, customer support, supply 
chain management and quality assurance.  Anniston Army Depot provides the skilled 
labor and facilities.  Anniston Army Depot is responsible for repair and overhaul, testing 
failure analysis, and sustainment management.  PROSE is expected to improve reliability 
by 30%.  However, the greater potential for improved reliability and long term O&S cost 
reduction rests in replacing the AGT 1500 engine with a new engine.  PROSE requires a 
$2.350 billion investment spread over 8 years from FY00-FY07.  It is fully funded by the 
Army.  PROSE projects potential savings of 13 billion over the remaining life of the tank 
by a 4 or 5-fold improvement in reliability, a 35% reduction in fuel consumption, a 42% 
reduction in the number of parts and significant improvement in vehicle mobility.  
The second initiative for the improved R&M is the Abrams Integrated 
Management (AIM) program.  The AIM process overhauls an old M1A1 tank to original 
factory standards, applying all applicable Maintenance Work Orders (MWO).  The tanks 
will be like new, although it will still have the old technology of the1980s.  The AIM 
tank project is estimated to result in 18% annual O&S cost savings. 
Uncertainty in funding has reduced the scope of the PROSE and AIM 
initiatives.  The number of PROSE engines and AIM tanks to be overhauled will likely be 
decreased significantly.  
b. Supply Chain Improvements 
Program:  Heavy Expanded Mobility Truck (HEMMT) 
Initiative:  Direct Vendor Delivery (DVD) 
DVD is a materiel acquisition and distribution method that requires 
supplier delivery directly to the customer.  The DVD contract was signed between DLA 
and Oshkosh Truck Corporation (OTC).  It captures 1811 items.  Since the DVD contact 
47 
has been in effect, actual savings of over $3 million for HEMMT unique materials have 
been reported.  As a result of decreased inventories, contractor design changes are 
expected to increase reliability. Ninety-five percent of HEMTT parts are still managed by 
Defense Logistic Agency (DLA), and both DLA and OTC are seeking ways to expand 
the content of the DVD arrangement. 
c. Competitive Product Support 
Program:  F-117 
Initiative: Total System Performance Responsibility 
Under F-117 TSPR, the contractor, LM Aero, assumes responsibility for 
system life-cycle management for the F-117 aircraft.  The TSPR contract incorporates 
incentives for the contractor through a cost plus arrangement with award fee and 
incentive fee provisions.  Additional costs and saving are shared 50/50 between the Air 
Force and LM Aero.  The contract is based on an eight-year strategy with LM Aero 
committed to a 10% savings.  The Air Force projects a savings of at least $170 million 
over eight years.  The TSPR process has already enabled the Air Force to reduce the SPO 
size from 226 to 55 members, representing an eight- year savings of $82M in reduced 
personnel costs.  The TSPR program has incurred under-runs from its start in 1999.  The 
program office reinvested their share of TSPR under-runs in other initiatives, such as the 
engine sustainment program. 
2. Funding 
Program: C-17 
Initiative: Multi-year Contracting 
The C-17 Multi-year contracting is helpful in emphasizing the cost savings effects 
of budget stability.  The C17’s $14.2 billion seven-year multi-year contract for 80 
airplanes is the longest and the largest multi-year contract ever entered into by the 
Government.  In addition to previously negotiated annual savings of more than $4.4 
billion realized from production efficiencies, streamlining and reform initiatives, the Air 
Force projects savings of over $1 billion through these long-term commitments. 
The C-17 strategy incorporates innovative features, including performance based 
financing.  For example, the contract states that future procurement depends upon a 25% 
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reduction in the C-17 average per-plane cost.  This creates a good incentive for Boeing to 
manage the costs and work on proposals for additional aircraft. 
3. Laws 
The researcher could not find any best practices regarding laws and regulations to 
help block the inhibitors of R-TOC. 
4. Tools 
Program:  JSTARS 
Initiative: JSTARS Cost and Performance System (J-CAPS) 
JCAPS is a set of analytical tools intended to perform the tasks stated below. 
• Data warehousing of current financial and performance data  to produce J-
CAPS reports and tracks information and provides a single point data 
system for external reporting and information needs; 
• Marginal analysis for assessing budget additions/cuts; 
• Budget planning for POM exercises; and, 
• Analysis of R-TOC proposals. 
The above-intended functions are incorporated into the Statement of Objectives 
(SOO).  Under the Total Systems Support Responsibility (TSSR) contract, Northrop 
Grumman is free and responsible for selecting system architecture, models and 
technology.  The JCAPS will be instrumental in performing R-TOC analysis and aid in 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has examined how efficiently the pilot programs in DoD have tested 
the R-TOC concepts.  The conclusions in this chapter respond to the subsidiary research 
questions presented in Chapter I and also answer the researcher’s primary research 
question.  This chapter also presents some recommendations for the DoD leadership to 
further enhance R-TOC initiatives and provides suggestions for further research topics. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The first subsidiary question asked “Why is R-TOC important for DoD?” As 
shown in the comparative figures in Chapter II, DoD established the R-TOC pilot 
programs in order to determine methods to shift funding needs from O&S to 
procurement.  R-TOC initiatives were the most efficient way to fight the “Death Cycle” 
and prevent a future possible decline in equipment modernization.  Overall, R-TOC is 
important in terms of devising strategies to relieve O&S cost pressures and increase 
procurement funding. 
The second subsidiary question asked, “What are the R-TOC pilot programs?”  A 
presentation of the R-TOC Pilot Programs presented in Chapter II provided an overview 
of each pilot program.  It is important to recognize that these programs are in various 
phases of their life cycle: Twenty are fielded systems, five are in a developmental phase, 
and the remaining five are in production phases.  This diversity of phases is intentional to 
exploit “lessons learned” from the pilot programs in every phase of a weapon’s life cycle.  
The pilot programs are also testing diverse reengineering concepts, such as the Total 
System Performance Responsibility arrangement (TSPR), Virtual Prime Vendor support, 
Public/Private partnering, and Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) improvements. 
Some programs, such as Abrams, H-60, F-117 and SBIRS, include mixed efforts.  
Abrams involves both public-private partnership and engine replacement efforts (R&M 
improvement).  In such cases, it becomes more difficult for the pilot programs to evaluate 
the effectiveness of each individual initiative and to distill concepts or approaches that 
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can be “carbon-copied.”  It is impractical to precisely analyze how much of the actual 
savings that should be attributed to each one of an array of initiatives. 
The third subsidiary question was “How are the R-TOC pilot programs currently 
performing?” Chapter IV emphasizes that the Pilot Programs will not meet the FY2003 
milestone to turn these pilot test results into an overarching depart-wide implementation 
plan.  This is mostly because some of the systems that are still in the acquisition pipeline 
and can not provide credible cost projections.  Chapter IV also presents the inhibitors for 
R-TOC performance, among which budget instability might be the most significant 
inhibitor. Without budget stability, the PM cannot be held accountable for cost 
reductions.  There are various worthy R-TOC initiatives, but they require a commitment 
of resources over a period of several years against which the current one-year funding 
process works.  The other inhibitors were identified as follows: 
• Lack of Program Manager Control over O&M accounts 
• Retention of savings from R-TOC initiatives 
• Restrictive laws, such as the 50:50 rule and the “core logistics” definition 
Chapter IV also illustrates the performance of pilot programs in accordance with 
DSAC’s goal of 20% TOC reduction by FY2005.  These programs are established on a 
basis of trial and error.  Therefore, it is not logical to consider whether a R-TOC program 
is on track by just looking at the numbers.  This thesis, rather than concentrating on the 
DSAC goal, regards the administration of the “lessons learned” process as a more 
important performance indicator.  The performance of R-TOC is a step in the right 
direction, because it forces PMs to consider TOC in their programs, helps to identify 
obstacles, and encourages savings initiatives.  Although maximum R-TOC progress will 
depend on changes in the law described in Chapter IV, OSD should continue to 
encourage R-TOC to achieve benefits such as have been demonstrated in the R-TOC 
pilot programs. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the issues identified in this thesis, the following recommendations are 
made to help resolve the problems inhibiting the R-TOC initiatives and the continuity of 
the R-TOC process. 
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• Department-wide policies should be written with detailed instructions on 
how to formulate, and submit TOC initiatives. The R-TOC program 
should be extended to all DoD weapon systems as soon as possible.  The 
developmental pilot programs may offer significant contributions and 
should be included as emerging results in the absence of complete savings 
data. 
• Sustainment funding should be condensed into one single account for each 
program and placed under PM control.  This would yield significant cost 
reductions by providing the PM with more flexibility to optimize 
Sustainment Support.   
• DoD should establish a policy to reinvest the savings in the program 
realizing the savings.  The removal or transfer of R-TOC savings is a 
disincentive hampering the effectiveness of the R-TOC process. 
• More effective and user friendly tools should be established to make the 
complex R-TOC process easier for smaller programs which do not have 
the necessary analysis staff and that do not have the resources to manage 
R-TOC internally. 
• A flexible budgeting process for managing R-TOC initiatives is necessary 
to get R-TOC initiatives approved and started. Funding needs to be 
structured in a manner that discourages arbitrary changes in approved 
funding levels. 
• DoD should establish department-wide guidelines for the sharing of R-
TOC savings between the Contractor and the Government.  This is 
necessary to encourage contractor involvement.  Without motivated 
contractors, R-TOC is unlikely to be a success. 
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Several areas for further research relating to R-TOC efforts are identified below: 
• An analysis of the baseline calculation of R-TOC pilot programs and 
means to improve the existing cost databases such as VAMOSC, OSMIS 
and AFTOC. 
• An action plan or a policy draft to extend R-TOC initiatives to all DoD 
weapon systems. 


















































LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. Pallas, Spiros and Michael, J. Novak, “Reduction of Total Ownership Cost (R-
TOC),” Program Manager, p. 62, November-December 2000. 
2. Website, Department of Defense (DoD), Reduction of Total Ownership Cost (R-
TOC), [http://www.rtoc.ida.org]. 
3. Rumsfeld, H. Donald, “Testimony Prepared for Delivery on the 2002 Defense 
Department Amended Budget to the House Appropriations Committee,” July 16, 
2001. 
4. Brasher, Bart: “Downsizing the US Military,” Greenwood Press, p. 212, 2000. 
5.  Report, Congressional Budget Office (CBO): “The Effects of Aging on the Costs 
of Operating and Maintaining Military Equipment,” August 2001. 
6.  Report, General Accounting Office (GAO): “Modernization Plans Will Not 
Reduce Average Age of Aircraft” GAO-01-163, February 9, 2001. 
7. The Age Page Gazette, Naval Air Systems Command, Vol. 1-01, p. 1, March 15, 
2001. 
8. Winagrad, Erin, “Army’s Apache Helicopter Outsourcing Plan Officially 
Rejected,” Inside the Pentagon, October 7, 1999. 
9. Ordway, Dick, DPM Apache Attack Helicopter, Briefing: “OSD Pilot Forum,” 
May 15, 2002. 
10. Williams, Daniel, Rah-66 Comanche PMO, Briefing: “Supportability Overview,” 
May 15, 2002. 
11. Dalton, Ron, Briefing: “CH-47 Pilot Program Review,” May 15, 2002. 
12. Ellis A., MAJ John, Briefing: “Fire Support Command and Control Pilot 
Program,” February 5, 2002. 
13. Scharra, Michael and Tom, Eick, Briefing: “Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical 
Truck,” August 6, 2002. 
14. Naudin, COL James and LTC Max, Carrol, Briefing: “HIMARS Overview 
Briefing,” February 5, 2002. 
15.  Flanigan, Michael, Briefing: “Tow Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) 
Eight Quarterly Forum R-TOC,” November 7, 2001. 
55 
16.  Dowling, Steve, Briefing: “SLAMM-ER Pilot Program Forum Brief,” February 
6, 2002. 
17. Albrecht, Dennis, Briefing: “Aviation Support Equipment Pilot Program 
Quarterly Forum,” November 7, 2001. 
18. Shannon, CAPT Bill USN, Briefing: “H-60 Multi-Mission Helicopter,” August 7, 
2002. 
19. Manich, Tony, Briefing: “EA-6B Reduce Total Ownership Cost Presentation,” 
November 7, 2001. 
20. Bayard, Richard, Briefing: “R-TOC Pilot Program Quarterly Forum,” August 6, 
2002. 
21. Morton, MAJ U. L., Briefing: “Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement RTOC 
Pilot Program,” November 8, 2001. 
22. Needham, CAPT William, Briefing: “Common Ship,” May 15, 2002. 
23. Sims, Suzanne, Briefing: “A 21st Century Ship for the 21st Century Sailor,” May 
15, 2002. 
24. Barlett, Dave, Briefing: “AEGIS Cruiser Reduced TOC Pilot Program,” February 
6, 2002. 
25.  Gilbert, COL Fred, Briefing: “F-16 R-TOC Update,” November 7, 2001. 
26. Kwiegara, Lt COL David, Briefing: “Space Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS),” 
August 6, 2002. 
27. Geiser, MAJ Francis, Briefing: “C-5 System Program Office Reduced-Total 
Ownership Cost,” May 15, 2002. 
28. Showronek, Lt COL Thomas, Briefing: “F-117 R-TOC Quarterly Status,” 
November 7, 2001. 
29.  Srnec, Jack, Briefing: “C/KC-135 R-TOC,” February 5, 2002. 
30. Wise, Lt COL Richard, Briefing, “OSD DSAC Pilot Program Forum,” May 15, 
2002. 
31. Kennedy, Roserika, Briefing: “C-17 Systems Program Office Eleventh Quarterly 
Reduction in Total Ownership Cost (RTOC) Pilots’ Forum,” August 7,2002. 
32. Bleau, Rich, Briefing: “Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System R-TOC,” 
February 5, 2002. 
56 
33. Robilliard, Lt COL Lucie, Briefing: “AWACS Reduction Total Ownership Cost,” 
August 6, 2002. 
34. Miller, COL Michael, Briefing: “B-1 Reduction in Total Ownership Cost 
(RTOC),” July 25, 2001. 
35. Report, General Accounting Office (GAO): “Actions Needed to Enhance Success 
of Reengineering Initiatives,” GAO/NSIAD-00-89, June 23, 2000. 
36.  Report, General Accounting Office (GAO): “Higher Priority needed for Army 
O&S Reduction Efforts,” GAO/NSIAD-00-197, September 29,2000. 
37.  Report, General Accounting Office (GAO): “Risks in Operation and Maintenance 
and Procurement Programs,” GAO-01-33, October 5, 2000. 
38.  Report, General Accounting Office (GAO): “Integrated Approach, 
Accountability, and Incentives are Keys to Effective Reform,” GAO-01-681T, 
May 8, 2001. 
39.  Report, General Accounting Office (GAO): “Air Force Lack Data to Assess 
Contractor Logistics Support Approaches,” GAO-01-618, September 7, 2001. 
40.  Report, General Accounting Office (GAO): “Opportunities to Improve the 
Army’s and the Navy’s Decision Making Process for Weapon System Support,” 
GAO-02-306, February 28, 2002. 
41.  Pallas, Spiros and Micheal J.Novak: “Reduction of Total Ownership Cost  
(RTOC),” Program Manager, p. 93, January-February, 2002. 
42.   Report, General Accounting Office (GAO): “Change in Reporting Practices and 
Requirements Could Enhance Congressional Oversight,” October 18, 2002. 
43. Wussler, Lt COL Don, Briefing: “AWACS R-TOC Status and the LDHD 
Challenge,” August 6, 2002. 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
58 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 








5. Michael W. Boudreau 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
6. Professor Bill Gates 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
7. Huseyin Demir 
Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanligi 
 Bakanliklar 
 Ankara, Turkey 
59 
